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1 INTRODUCTION
On 18 December 2015, the Court of Appeal of The Hague in The
Netherlands handed down three judgments in connection with the
‘Shell Nigeria issue’: a series of claims brought by Nigerian
residents and by Vereniging Milieudefensie (‘Milieudefensie’, the
Dutch member association of Friends of the Earth International)
against four legal entities belonging to the Shell Group. The claims
rest on allegations of environmental damage resulting from the
Shell Group’s operations in Nigeria. The purpose of the claims
brought by Milieudefensie et al. is to obtain an injunction ordering
the Shell companies to pay damages, undo the environmental
pollution and take steps to prevent further harm to the
environment. The three judgments of the Court of Appeal of The
Hague follow appeals against three decisions that the District
Court rendered on 30 January 2013.1 The judgments on appeal are
legally complex, involving a total of six cases that each include an
interim judgment on the procedural aspects of ‘Phase 1’.
The Court of Appeal’s first judgment (Shell-Nigeria I/Oguru &
Efanga, or ‘S-N1’) deals with ‘Case A’ and ‘Case B’: Case A is the
appeal by Nigerian residents F.A. Oguru and A. Efanga and by
Milieudefensie in the proceedings against Shell Petroleum NV of
The Hague (‘Shell Petroleum’) and The ‘Shell’ Transport and
Trading Company Ltd of London (‘Shell T&T’). Case B is the same
parties’ appeal in the proceedings against Royal Dutch Shell Plc of
London (‘RDS’) and the Nigerian company, Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. (‘SPDC’).2 Cases A and B
revolve around oil spills from an underground oil pipeline in
Bayelsa State (one of the states making up the Nigerian federation)
and the impact on fishing ponds and farmland worked by Oguru
and Efanga. The district court rejected the claims in these cases,
finding that the damage had resulted from sabotage.
The second judgment (Shell-Nigeria II/Dooh, or ‘S-N2’) deals
with ‘Case C’ and ‘Case D’: the appeals by Nigerian resident E.B.
Dooh and Milieudefensie in the proceedings against RDS and
SPDC (Case C) and against Shell Petroleum and Shell T&T
(Case D).3 These cases also revolve around oil spills from an
underground oil pipeline in Bayelsa State in the Nigerian
federation, after which the oil caught fire, and the impact on
fishing ponds and farmland worked by Dooh. Again, the district
court rejected the claims in these cases, finding that the damage
had resulted from sabotage.
Shell-Nigeria III/Akpan (‘S-N3’), the Court of Appeal’s third
judgment, concerns the appeals in Cases E (Milieudefensie versus
RDS and SPDC) and F (SPDC versus Nigerian resident F.A.
Akpan).4 These cases revolve around oil spills from an oil
exploration well (which was not used for oil extraction) in Akwa
Ibom State (another state of the Nigerian federation) and the
impact on fishing ponds worked by Akpan. The district court
found against SPDC, holding that although the damage resulted
from sabotage, SPDC (by the standards of Nigerian law) had been
negligent and failed to sufficiently secure the oil well against that
sabotage. However, the district court rejected all other claims. In
Case E Milieudefensie appealed against the district court’s other
decisions, while in Case F SPDC lodged an appeal against the
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decision to award the claim that had been brought against it.
The interim judgments by the Court of Appeal of The Hague
in Phase 1 primarily deal with sub-aspects of the proceedings
based on a series of ancillary proceedings that had been instituted.
The Court of Appeal has declared its judgments to be immediately
enforceable, notwithstanding further appeal, and has referred the
disputes to Phase 2 for consideration of the merits in the main
action. Section 2 below discusses various general matters. Sections
3–6 then address a number of procedural issues on which the
court ruled in Phase 1. The decisions in the court’s interim
judgments may become relevant and carry over to the Phase 2
proceedings on the merits; whether they do so, and if so, to what
extent, is discussed in section 7.
2 GENERAL MATTERS
RDS (a publicly traded company) has been at the head of the
Royal Dutch Shell Group since 2005. Before then, the group was
run using a ‘dual-listed companies’ (DLC) structure that involved
two publicly traded top-tier management companies: Shell
Petroleum and Shell T&T.5 RDS, the new top-tier management
company, is based in London, though its head office is in The
Hague. SPDC is a Nigeria-based subsidiary. In the Shell Nigeria
cases, the claimants summoned not only SPDC – the operating
company – but also the former top-tier management companies
Shell Petroleum and Shell T&T and the new top-tier management
company RDS. The reason for this approach was that
Milieudefensie et al. attributed the environmental damage, in the
words of the Court of Appeal of The Hague, ‘to wrongful acts and
negligence of (i) SPDC as operator of the pipeline, but also of (ii)
RDS as head of the Shell Group and, via group companies,
shareholder in SPDC, and of (iii) Shell Petroleum and Shell T&T,
who formerly jointly played this role of parent company/indirect
shareholder’ (S-N1 paragraph 1.1, S-N2 paragraph 1.1, cf. S-N3
paragraph 1.3). Where possible, this text refers to SPDC, Shell
Petroleum and Shell T&T and to RDS, by themselves or separately,
as ‘Shell’.
The court found that the litigating parties were in agreement
about the legal regime under which the claims of Milieudefensie et
al. including the claims against the former and current top-tier
management companies should be considered substantively:
‘in that the claims, including those against the parent company,
must be assessed according to Nigerian law, being the law of the
state where (i) the spill occurred, (ii) the ensuing damage occurred
and (iii) SPDC, whose acts and omissions were allegedly
monitored insufficiently, has its registered office (cf. section 3
Dutch Conflict of Laws (Torts) Act 2001 (Wet conflictenrecht
onrechtmatige daad) applicable here). Accordingly, this judgment
assumes that Nigerian law is applicable’ (S-N1 paragraph 1.3; see
also S-N2 paragraph 1.3, S-N3 paragraph 1.5).
3 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS (STANDING, AUTHORITY AND
DISCLOSURE)
Shell first disputed the ‘right of action’ of the Nigerian residents.
Its argument revolved around the fact that the fishing ponds and/
or farmlands were held in family use, and that therefore those
residents did not satisfy the requirement of having ‘exclusive
ownership or exclusive possession’ of those lands. Among other
arguments, Shell based this position on a report by a Nigerian legal
expert that defined the requirement of ‘ownership or possession’.
The Court of Appeal of The Hague inferred from Nigerian case
law that ‘possession’ required nothing more than ‘occupation or
physical use’. In addition, Nigerian case law revealed that matters
involving lands held in family use are concerned only with injury
to the claimant’s interests, which is the case if he or she uses the
lands. The fact that the Nigerian residents had in fact made use of
the fishing ponds and/or farmlands was evidenced by statements
from Chiefs of the communities to which those residents belonged
(cf. S-N1 paragraph 4.2, S-N2 paragraph 5.6, S-N3 paragraph 4.2).
Shell disputed Milieudefensie’s standing on a number of
grounds.
Based on Article 305a Book 3 Dutch Civil Code, Milieudefensie
claimed that foundations and associations possessing full legal
capacity are permitted to bring a class action ‘intended to protect
similar interests of other persons to the extent that its articles
promotes such interests’. It was Shell’s opinion that the assessment of
Milieudefensie’s standing should be considered based on lex causae:
the question of ‘whether a material claim exists in the event of the
environmental or other interests advocated by the foundation/
association, for example based on a claim for a tort’ (the Court of
Appeal’s summary of Shell’s argument in S-N1 paragraph 3.2, S-
N2 paragraph 4.2, S-N3 paragraph 3.2). This would mean that a
foundation or association bringing a class action that cannot be
awarded on material grounds also has no standing for the reason
that the claim itself also fails. The Court of Appeal rejected this
argument on the following grounds: ‘However, under Dutch private
international law the question of whether this right of action can be
enforced in a class action [ . . .] – and if so, to what extent and how –
5 Cf. C.E. Honée, ‘De Koninklijke is niet meer: lang leve Royal Dutch!(?)’, Ondernemingsrecht 2015/13, pp. 440–445 (no. 153).
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must be characterised as a procedural matter, to which the lex fori
processus – i.e. Dutch law – applies’ (S-N1 paragraph 3.2, S-N3
paragraph 3.2, cf. S-N2 paragraph 4.2). Only ‘[a] negative answer to
this question of procedural law means that the case would evade the
court’s assessment’ (S-N1 paragraph 3.2, S-N2 paragraph 4.2, S-N3
paragraph 3.2). The court added that Article 305a Book 3 Dutch
Civil Code simply makes provision for the possibility of a class
action.
Among other findings, the court considered as follows for
purposes of assessing other arguments put forward by Shell in
connection with Milieudefensie’s standing:
‘Nor is the group of persons for whose benefit the action has been
instituted so small and clearly defined that it was easy to realise
litigation in the names of the interested parties’ and ‘Shell’s
suggestion that Milieudefensie does not possess sufficient
knowledge and skills for the present environmental action lacks
proper substantiation; it is not sufficient to argue that
Milieudefensie neither works nor is established in the area’ (S-N1
paragraph 3.4, S-N2 paragraph 4.4, S-N3 paragraph 3.4).
When considering the argument that Shell derived from Article
305a(2) Book 3 Dutch Civil Code, i.e., that Milieudefensie had no
standing as its claim did not sufficiently safeguard the interests of
the persons on whose behalf the claim had been brought, the court
found that this provision does not reflect a representativeness
requirement, but rather is meant to prevent class actions by
foundations and associations seeking to use the right to class
action for ‘their own commercial motives’. In the specific case of
Milieudefensie, the court held, ‘[n]or is there any reason to doubt
the ultimate object of Milieudefensie to realise a cleaner environment
in situ’. Shell had also argued that Dutch claims foundations and
claims associations may not use Article 305a Book 3 Dutch Civil
Code for advocating purely non-Dutch interests. The court also
rejected this argument: ‘No valid grounds exist to restrict the scope of
application of article 305(a) Book 3 Dutch Civil Code as proposed by
Shell’ (S-N1 paragraph 3.4, cf. S-N2 paragraph 4.4, S-N3 paragraph
3.4).
4 JURISDICTION OF THE DUTCH JUDICIARY IN THE PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST RDS, SHELL PETROLEUM AND SHELL T&T
The Court of Appeal of The Hague included a brief paragraph
confirming the jurisdiction (including at the international level) of
the Dutch judiciary in the proceedings brought against RDS, Shell
Petroleum and Shell T&T:
Shell Petroleum is a company with its registered office in this
country, for which reason the Dutch judiciary has jurisdiction
(under article 2(1) of the Brussels I Regulation) to hear any claim
brought against that company. With regard to RDS, which does
not have its registered office in this country, this jurisdiction is
based on article 2(1) in conjunction with article 60(1) Brussels I
Regulation; and with regard to Shell T&T, which similarly does
not have its registered office in the Netherlands, this jurisdiction is
based if not on article 6(1), then on article 24 Brussels I
Regulation (S-N1 paragraph 2.9, S-N2 paragraph 3.9).
The Brussels I Regulation is the European Regulation on
jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters. The court referred to the Regulation that
entered into force on 1 March 2002 (Council Regulation (EC) no.
44/2001);6 on 10 January 2015 a ‘recast’ of the Regulation came
into effect (Regulation (EU) no. 1215/2012).7 The Regulation is
sometimes referred to as the Brussels I Regulation. Among other
things, the Regulation makes provision for ‘common rules on
jurisdiction’ that apply in the Member States ‘when the defendant is
domiciled in one of those Member States’. Its purpose includes, in
principle, to bring ‘all the main civil and commercial matters’ within
the Regulation’s scope of operation (recital to Council Regulation
(EC) no. 44/2001, paragraphs 8 and 7, cf. recital to Regulation
(EU) no. 1215/2012, paragraphs 13 and 10).
The court based the jurisdiction of the Dutch judiciary in
respect of the Dutch legal entity Shell Petroleum on Article 2(1)
Council Regulation (EC) no. 44/2001. According to Article 2(1)
‘persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their
nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State’ (cf.
Article 4(1) Regulation (EU) no. 1215/2012). The court based the
jurisdiction of the Dutch judiciary in respect of RDS, which is
domiciled in London but has its head office in The Hague, on
Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 60(1) Council Regulation
(EC) no. 44/2001. Article 60(1) states:
For the purposes of this Regulation, a company or other legal
person or association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at
the place where it has its:
(a) statutory seat, or
(b) central administration, or
(c) principal place of business (cf. Article 63(1) Regulation (EU)
no. 1215/2012).
Since the three categories listed in Article 60(1) represent
alternatives that exist side by side,8 it is sufficient for jurisdiction to
6 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ EC 2001 L 12/
1-23.
7 Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters (recast), OJ EU L 351/1-32.
8 M. George, J. Fitchen & M.-E. Ancel, Chapter 15: General Provisions, in The Brussels I Regulation Recast 541–555 (547) (A. Dickinson & E. Lein eds, Oxford University Press
2015).
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accrue to the Dutch judiciary that RDS has its head office in the
Netherlands. For Shell T&T, which is domiciled in London, the
court stated that the jurisdiction of the Dutch judiciary could be
derived either from Article 6(1) or from Article 24 Council
Regulation (EC) no. 44/2001. Article 6(1) states that ‘[a] person
domiciled in a Member State may also be sued’, ‘where he is one of a
number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of
them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it
is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate’ (cf. Article 8(1)
Regulation (EU) no. 1215/2012). In cases involving multiple
defendants, this provision awards the judiciary in a Member State
jurisdiction (specifically international jurisdiction) in respect of all
defendants, including defendants that could otherwise not be
included in the proceedings, if the claims against the defendants
are so closely connected that they should be handled together. The
claim against the defendant in respect of whom the court already
has jurisdiction is the ‘anchor claim’ that, if the requirement of a
‘close connection’ is satisfied, also grants jurisdiction over the other
defendants. Article 24 also awards jurisdiction to ‘a court of a
Member State before which a defendant enters an appearance’ (i.e.,
voluntarily; cf. Article 26(1) Regulation (EU) no. 1215/2012).
5 JURISDICTION OF THE DUTCH JUDICIARY IN THE PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST SPDC
In the proceedings against SPDC, the subsidiary domiciled in
Nigeria, the Court of Appeal of The Hague followed the district
court by deriving the jurisdiction (and specifically the international
jurisdiction) of the Dutch courts not only from Article 6(1)
Council Regulation (EC) no. 44/2001 but also and primarily on the
related Article 7(1) Dutch Code of Civil Procedure considered in
conjunction with Article 6(1) Council Regulation (EC) no. 44/
2001. The claim against RDS was the anchor claim. Article 7(1)
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure also gives the Dutch judiciary
jurisdiction in respect of multiple defendants where an anchor
claim exists and where the requirement of a ‘close connection’ and
the requirement of ‘expediency of joint consideration’ have been
satisfied:
If legal proceedings are to be initiated by a writ of summons and
a Dutch court has jurisdiction with respect to one of the
defendants, then it has jurisdiction as well with respect to the
other defendants who are called to the same proceedings, provided
that the rights of action against the different defendants are
connected with each other in such a way that a joint consideration
is justified for reasons of efficiency.
SPDC put forward various arguments against basing the
international jurisdiction of the Dutch courts on Article 7(1)
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. Those arguments concerned, on
the one hand, the possibility of using the claim against RDS as an
anchor claim, and on the other the requirements of a ‘close
connection’ and ‘expediency of joint consideration’. On the subject
of the claim against RDS as the anchor claim, SPDC noted that the
environmental damage had occurred before RDS took charge of
the Shell Group. The court rejected this argument based on the
following reasoning: ‘However, this circumstance does not mean that
RDS’s liability for the consequences of a failure of previous group
management and/or its obligation to prevent new spills and clean up
the existing pollution must necessarily be excluded’ (S-N1
paragraph 2.2, S-N2 paragraph 3.2). SPDC also noted that the
claim against RDS could not serve as an anchor claim on the
grounds that, as it felt, the claim against RDS manifestly stood no
possibility of succeeding. In this connection, the court found, ‘[n]o
“manifest certainty of failure” is involved here, however, as it cannot
be ruled out in advance that a parent company may, in certain
circumstances, have liability for loss or damage resulting from acts or
omissions of a subsidiary or a subsubsidiary’ (S-N1 paragraph 2.2,
S-N2 paragraph 3.2, S-N3 paragraph 2.2). The court then added:
Considering the foreseeably serious consequences, including for the
local environment, of oil spills from a potential spill source, it
must not necessarily be ruled out that in such a case the parent
company may be expected to take an interest in preventing spills
(in other words, that a duty of care exists [ . . .]), the more so if it
has made prevention of environmental damage by its group
companies’ activities a spearhead and has a degree of active
involvement in and control over the operations of those
companies. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible for
the duty of care to be breached without this interest and
involvement and that culpable negligence with regard to the
interests in question cannot in any instance result in liability. This
is not altered by the fact that, as Shell argues, no judgments have
been rendered by Nigerian courts that accept group liability on
these grounds (S-N1 paragraph 2.2, cf. S-N2 paragraph 3.2, S-
N3 paragraph 2.2).
The court then went on to address the requirements of a ‘close
connection’ and of ‘expediency of joint consideration’:
Considering: (i) that a corporate group relationship exists between
the defendants who are being held liable as the joint and several
co-debtors, in which the acts, omissions and negligence of SPDC
as a group company play an important role for purposes of
determining the liability/obligation, if any, of RDS as the top
holding; (ii) that the claim brought against them is identical and
(iii) has the same factual basis, in that it concerns the same spill,
while (iv) the discussion of the facts largely focuses on questions
such as what caused the spill and whether enough was done to
prevent it and to remedy the consequences, in which connection
(v) possibly further investigation is required, (vi) which
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investigation should preferably be carried out by a single court to
avoid divergent findings and assessments, the conclusion must be
that the claims against RDS and those against SPDC are
connected to the extent that reasons of expediency justify a joint
hearing within the meaning of article 7(1) Dutch Code of Civil
Procedure (S-N1 paragraph 2.4, S-N2, paragraph 3.4, see also
S-N3 paragraph 2.4)
6 THE CLAIM FOR DISCLOSURE
Milieudefensie et al. sought an injunction, based on Article 843a
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, ordering Shell to provide access to
internal paperwork in Shell’s possession (a claim for disclosure).
The Court of Appeal of The Hague awarded this claim in part.
According to Milieudefensie et al. it was very important to
establish – based in part on that internal paperwork – what the
cause was of the various oil spills. Their reasoning was that under
the Nigerian Oil Pipelines Act ‘SPDC is strictly liable if the spill
resulted from corrosion/insufficient maintenance, whereas if sabotage
caused the spill this provision will provide an argument absolving it
from liability. However, it is SPDC’s responsibility to prove the
correctness of that argument’ (court’s summary of Milieudefensie’s
argument in S-N1 paragraph 5.1, S-N2 paragraph 6.1, cf. S-N3
paragraph 5.1). The court found as follows:
On the occasion of the pleadings in Phase 1 of the appeal the
question was raised of whether an investigation by experts might
as yet yield a clearer understanding of the cause of the damage,
for which purpose – insofar as this would still helpful and (for
safety reasons) sensible some 10 years after the incident – the
relevant hole in the pipeline should be subjected to physical
inspection. In response, Shell stated that such an inspection is still
possible and would be a much more obvious manner of gathering
evidence about the cause of the spill, if that course of action were
chosen, than submitting paperwork. The Court therefore asks the
parties to consider that, if they decide in mutual consultation that
it is expedient to have an investigation carried out by experts
(preferably three, and at the beginning of Phase 2), the Court will
in principle render assistance by delivering an interim judgment
(S-N1 paragraph 5.3, cf. S-N2 paragraph 6.3).
The court then added, ‘If it is then established that sabotage was
the cause of the damage, a decision is still needed in the main actions
on the accusation that Shell was negligent in preventing it’, and ‘The
number of times such sabotage had previously occurred to this and
possibly other subterraneous pipelines [ . . .] might have bearing on
this matter’ (S-N1 paragraph 5.5, cf. S-N2 paragraph 6.5).
One of the arguments put forward by Shell was that Group
management was unaware of the oil spills ‘and that the requested
document do not concern those oil spills’ (court’s summary of Shell’s
argument in S-N1 paragraph 5.8, S-N2 paragraph 6.8, S-N3
paragraph 5.4): Shell disputed the relevance of the claim for
disclosure and Milieudefensie’s interest in that claim. The court
rejected this defence, reasoning as follows:
The assertion by Shell that the parent company did not
know about the spillage and the condition and maintenance of the
pipeline locally does not seem to be an adequate defence in all
cases, particularly not if sabotage is ruled out as a cause of
damage. Considering, among other things, (i) that Shell sets itself
goals and ambitions with regard to such matters as the
environment, and has defined a Group policy to achieve these
goals and ambitions in a coordinated and uniform manner, and
(ii) that RDS (just as the former parent company) monitors
compliance with these Group standards and this Group policy,
such questions arise as: (a) what maintenance and other
standards applied to old pipelines such as the one in question;
(b) were these maintenance and other standards satisfied; (c) if so,
where is this evidenced, and if not, should this not have been
noted within the context of the supervision exercised by the parent
company (the audits); (d) if an adequate reporting system was in
place and (e) why not? Another question is (f) whether the parent
company – given the autonomy and individual responsibility of
SPDC and its directors – was sufficiently equipped (in terms of
expertise, opportunities and means) to intervene adequately in the
event that any negligence became apparent on the part of SPDC
(S-N1 paragraph 5.9, cf. S-N2 paragraph 6.9, S-N3 paragraph
5.5).
The court awarded Milieudefensie et al.’s claim in respect of
some of the documents. The reasoning here included that these
were documents that ‘may [ . . .] be material in assessing how the
supervision was given shape and relevant information was shared
with the parent company’, and that ‘that inspection [ . . .] may be
important within the context of the alleged violation of a duty of
care’ (S-N1 paragraph 5.10, S-N2 paragraph 6.10, S-N3
paragraph 5.6).
7 MATERIAL GROUNDS FOR THE CLAIMS (TORT AND DUTY OF
CARE)
Phase 2 of the proceedings in the ‘Shell Nigeria issue’ is the
substantive phase, to establish the extent to which the claims
brought against the top-tier management companies RDS, Shell
Petroleum and Shell T&T and against SPDC, the Nigerian
subsidiary, by Milieudefensie et al. have merit. An important
element in that phase will be the question of whether it will as yet
be possible to ascertain what the cause was of the various oil spills.
If the cause is established to be sabotage, SPDC will have a strong
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argument, though not necessarily a decisive one, for being absolved
from liability. If the cause is found to lie in poor maintenance, it
will become difficult for SPDC to avoid liability. In either instance,
if the claim against SPDC is awarded, the question arises of
whether the top-tier management companies RDS, Shell Petroleum
and Shell T&T may also be held liable. That question goes to the
scope of the duty of care of a group’s top-tier management
company (or companies) – in the present matter, what duty of care
RDS, Shell Petroleum and Shell T&T have in respect of the
Nigerian residents who in these proceedings have asserted
environmental damage, and more generally in respect of the
Nigerian residents whom Milieudefensie represents in the
proceedings. In this connection, the Court of Appeal of The Hague
considered the following general findings:
Given (i) the ongoing developments in the field of foreign direct
liability claims (cf. for example the cases brought in the United
States of America in the 1990s against Shell [ . . .]), added to (ii)
the many oil spills that occurred every year from the oil extraction
in Nigeria, (iii) the associated legal actions going back many years
(more than 60 years, according to Shell), (iv) the problems that
these oil spills present to humans and the environment and
(v) the increased focus on such problems, it must have been
reasonably foreseeable for RDS as the parent company and SPDC
as an operational division of the Shell Group that in time RDS
could become a target, and that SPDC, which had already been
involved in multiple court cases in Nigeria, could then also be
summoned before a court that had jurisdiction in respect of RDS
(S-N1 paragraph 2.6, S-N2 paragraph 3.6, S-N3 paragraph 2.6).
In more concrete terms, on the subject of the points of
reference that are important for determining whether a parent
company has a duty of care to prevent its subsidiary from causing
injury to third parties (group liability), the court held that
‘Nigerian law, being a common law system, is based on English law,
and common law and English case law are important sources of
knowledge in the Nigerian legal system’ (S-N1 paragraph 2.2, S-N2
paragraph 3.2, S-N3 paragraph 2.2). The court then referred to
various judgments under English law, including in Chandler v.
Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525 and Thompson v. The Renwick
Group Plc [2014] EWCA Civ 635. In the court’s interpretation of
the latter judgment, assuming group liability under common law
requires ‘a clear correlation [ . . .] between the loss or damage
incurred and the role that the parent company played within the
group; the crux being that a situation exists in which the parent
company, given “its superior knowledge or expertise” “is better
placed” to intervene’ (S-N1 paragraph 2.2, S-N2 paragraph 3.2, S-
N3 paragraph 2.2). In this connection, the court also considered as
follows:
One of the points of departure in the application of Nigerian law
will then be that it is not the place of a Dutch court to initiate an
entirely new legal development in Nigerian law (S-N1 paragraph
2.2, S-N2, paragraph 3.2, S-N3 paragraph 2.2).
An important argument that Shell had raised was the ‘degree of
discretion of the operating company’ that applies within the Shell
Group (S-N1 paragraph 2.2, S-N2, paragraph 3.2, S-N3
paragraph 2.2), which would stand in the way of assuming group
liability. To place this argument within the context of a
consideration of the proceedings under common law, it is
important to consider the judgments in Chandler v. Cape and
Thompson v. The Renwick Group Plc.
Chandler v. Cape [2012] EWCA Civ 525 revolved around a
dispute between D.B. Chandler and Cape Plc.9 A former employee
of a subsidiary of Cape (Cape Building Products Ltd), Chandler,
brought proceedings against the parent company, alleging injury
through exposure to asbestos. The court in the lower instance
found in favour of Chandler on 14 April 2011, upon which Cape
appealed. The English Court of Appeal pronounced judgment on
25 April 2012 and rejected that appeal. One of the important
findings by that Court of Appeal that has bearing on the ‘degree of
discretion of the operating company’ as put forward by Shell was the
following:
There is nothing in [ . . .] the general law to support the
submission [ . . .] that the duty of care can only exist in these cases
if the parent company has absolute control of the subsidiary
(paragraph 66).
The English Court of Appeal then proceeded to analyse the
dispute that had been brought before it. The following finding in
particular is interesting in that analysis:
[T]his case demonstrates that in appropriate circumstances the
law may impose on a parent company responsibility for the health
and safety of its subsidiary’s employees. Those circumstances
include a situation where, as in the present case, (1) the businesses
of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same;
(2) the parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some
relevant aspect of health and safety in the particular industry;
(3) the subsidiary’s system of work is unsafe as the parent
company knew, or ought to have known; and (4) the parent knew
or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees
would rely on its using that superior knowledge for the employees’
protection. For the purposes of (4) it is not necessary to show that
the parent is in the practice of intervening in the health and safety
policies of the subsidiary. The court will look at the relationship
between the companies more widely. The court may find that
9 The judgment can be found on www.bailii.org, the website of the British and Irish Legal Information Institute (full URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2012/525.html).
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element (4) is established where the evidence shows that the
parent has a practice of intervening in the trading operations of
the subsidiary, for example production and funding issues
(paragraph 80).
Thompson v. The Renwick Group Plc [2014] EWCA Civ 635
concerned a dispute between D. Thompson and The Renwick
Group Plc.10 A former employee of a subsidiary of The Renwick
Group, Thompson, brought action against the parent company,
again alleging injury through exposure to asbestos. The court in
the lower instance found in favour of Thompson on 24 April 2013,
upon which The Renwick Group appealed. The English Court of
Appeal rendered judgment on 13 May 2014 and rejected
Thompson’s claim. That Court of Appeal held that the relevant
question in that dispute was ‘whether the totality of evidence as
found by the trial judge is nevertheless sufficient to justify the
imposition of a duty of care on the parent company to protect the
subsidiary company’s employees from the risk of injury arising out of
exposure to asbestos at work’ (paragraph 27). Two of the
considerations that followed are of particular relevance here:
[W]hat one is looking for here is a situation in which the parent
company is better placed, because of its superior knowledge or
expertise, to protect the employees of subsidiary companies against
the risk of injury and moreover where, because of that feature, it
is fair to infer that the subsidiary will rely upon the parent
deploying its superior knowledge in order to protect its employees
from risk of injury (paragraph 37),
and:
[T]here is no basis upon which it can be asserted that the
Renwick Group Limited either did have or should have had any
knowledge of that risk superior to that which the subsidiaries
could be expected to have (paragraph 38).
The picture painted in Chandler v. Cape Plc and Thompson v.
The Renwick Group Plc is that to assume a duty of care on the part
of a parent company of a group it is important primarily to
establish whether, given all the circumstances of the case, both the
subsidiary and the persons who suffered injury could legitimately
expect that the parent company would (and therefore should) be
concerned with the interests of the persons asserting the injury.
The circumstances that are relevant for determining this include:
– whether the parent company and the subsidiary operate in the
same industry, meaning that the parent company possesses a
greater understanding of the risks of the subsidiary’s operations
than that subsidiary itself does; and
– whether the parent company knew, or should have known, that
the subsidiary’s operations presented risks.
It will further the claimant’s case if he can demonstrate that the
parent company was actively involved in the subsidiary’s
operations:
In the present case, Cape was clearly in the practice of issuing
instructions about the products of the company, for instance,
about product mixes. We know that Cape Products could not
incur capital expenditure without parent company approval. [ . . .]
There is nothing wrong in that but it suggests that the company
policy of Cape on subsidiaries was that there were certain matters
in respect of which they were subject to parent company direction
(Chandler v Cape Plc, paragraph 73).
Ultimately, the reason why the English Court of Appeal
dismissed the claim in Thompson v. The Renwick Group Plc was
that the parent company – despite being a shareholder in the
subsidiary – had no involvement in asbestos-related work (and that
therefore it could not be said to possess a greater understanding of
the risks of the subsidiary’s operations than that subsidiary itself
did):
There is no evidence that the Renwick Group Limited at any time
carried on any business at all apart from that of holding shares in
other companies, let alone that it carried on [ . . .] a business an
integral part of which was the warehousing or handling of
asbestos or indeed any potentially hazardous substance
(paragraph 37).
8 CONCLUSION
In the Shell Nigeria issue it will be difficult to maintain that the
top-tier management companies RDS, Shell Petroleum and Shell
T&T were not aware of the environmental risks that resulted from
the Shell Group’s operations in Nigeria, even if those top-tier
management companies themselves are or were not active in the
oil industry with their own factories and own installations. This
leads to the conclusion, albeit one with reservations, that the
chance that Milieudefensie et al.’s claims would succeed under the
applicable Nigerian common law should certainly not be
dismissed. Piercing the corporate veil for environmental reasons:
an issue that is evolving rapidly. To be continued!
10 The judgment can be found on www.bailii.org (full URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/635.html).
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